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Introduction 
Between birth and 7–8 years, children quickly mature in a variety of different ways[AQ2] (Doherty & Hughes, 2009). There is a 
vast amount of literature concerning this early years child development that deals with how their abilities advance ‘ … 
physically, socially, emotionally, cognitively and linguistically’ (Johnston, 2005, p. 1). Research in the developmental cognitive 
domain has been largely conducted by psychologists, not educationalists; one consequence of this being that at present, 
studies involving preschoolers’ science concepts are all but absent from the four most prominent journals in the field of science 
education. The current article will first consider some of this developmental psychology research and how it can be relevant to 
science educators, and then later discuss potential ways forward that may help increase the profile of early years science in 
the literature. 
Classic theorists have presented models of how children’s cognitive abilities progress throughout childhood, the best known of 
which is probably Piaget’s stages of cognitive development (Piaget, 1972). For Piaget, a child’s view of the world and the way it 
works is different in nature as well as degree of sophistication from that of an adult (Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mortimer, & Scott,  
1994). He proposed that there are periods during childhood that each individual passes through, and each period, or ‘stage’, 
i s characterised by particular qualities of thinking (Atherton, 2009). Each stage is markedly different from the others and 
children pass from one stage to the next in a predictable way, once an approximate age is reached. For instance, the concrete 
operational stage (7–11 years) is concerned with thinking about perceptual attributes of cases, while during the formal 
operational stage (11–16), abstract thought is developed (Atherton, 2009; Piaget, 1972). 
Contemporaries of Piaget, Bruner and colleagues formulated their own theory of child development that similarly delineated a 
predictable sequence of periods, with thinking evolving from being image-based to symbol-based (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin,  
1967). Vygotsky also shared many of Piaget’s assumptions about the way that children learn; however, he highlighted the 
importance of   the   social   context   of   learning   (MooneyGarhart   Mooney,   C,   2000.   Theories   of   Childhood: , 
[]2000). In Vygotsky’s theory, both teachers and older or more experienced children play a very important role in the 
children’s learning, opposing Piaget’s cognitive theory in which the teacher plays a limited role (Smidt, 2009; Vygotsky,  
1978). 
The above and other classic theorists had significant and lasting effects on education, particularly Piaget, whose stage model 
was readily accepted in a variety of educational contexts, with countless programmes and curricula having since been written 
based on the Piagetian view (Mooney, 2000). However, in spite of Piaget’s early, enduring popularity, nearly all modern 
cognitive psychologists now refute his stage model. Research has since demonstrated that there is little evidence for a 
stepwise progression of phases that is highly dependent on age (Doherty & Hughes, 2009). Classic discontinuous models of 
stepwise cognitive development often view children as solitary learners, failing to take into account the possible effects of 
social influences. For example, Jahoda (1983)[AQ4] found that Zimbabwean nine-year-olds who worked in the family business 
were able to understand the abstract concept of profit, something that British children were not able to grasp until 11–12 
years. Children raised in different cultures will construct concepts that reflect not only their current degree of cognitive 
development but also the norms and practices of those cultures. In the same vein, Vygotsky (1978) explained how in diverse 
cultures there are differences in social interactions which lead to a cultural variance in the acquisition of cognitive abilities. As a 
result, classic stepwise theories may give the impression that the development of cognitive abilities is predetermined, or 
‘hardwired’, with step changes occurring automatically when triggered by chronological age. Instead, modern constructivist 
theories of development assume that a child’s abilities are experience-mediated and not age-mediated – that is, concepts build 
up steadily over a period of time and depend wholly on the life experiences of each child. Therefore, a child’s formal education, 
interactions with parents and peers and contact with entertainment and other media are crucial factors for development. These 
views correspond with those of constructivist science educators such as Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982)[AQ5] 
who state that previous constructions are a major governing influence on new learning (see later). 
 
Conceptual development in the early years 
Historically, preschoolers’ conceptions of science were not investigable, as it was perceived that children could not understand 
scientific phenomena (De Kock, 2005). However, brain development research proves that a young brain develops rapidly 
neurologically during the first years of life (Doidge, 2007). Within the first 18 weeks of life, neurogenesis (production of 
neurons, i.e. nerve cells) occurs at an average rate of 500,000 per minute (Eliot, 1999[AQ6]). Using glial cells to guide them, 
these neurons migrate to their genetically preordained place, forming neurological connections which will be used to make 
sense of experiences (Eliot, 1999; Zull, 2002). Nowadays, research has begun to accept that the learning of concepts and 
conceptual change is in the centre of young children’s learning of science (Nussbaum, 1989). 
Scientific concepts can be seen as ‘those ideas or general notions of the common attributes of objects or events that help us 
to understand the natural and physical world around us’ (Bradley, 1996, p. 43). Vygotsky (1986) defines ‘scientific concepts’ 
as those concepts which are introduced in formal education (e.g. by a teacher), whereas he sees ‘spontaneous concepts’ as 
those which are acquired by children’s outside contexts in which explicit instruction is in place. He also refers to the concept of 
‘mediation’ which leads to the development of a ‘non-deterministic account in which the individual acts upon and is acted upon 
by social, cultural and historical factors’ (Daniel, 2002, p. 14). Alternatively, Johnston ( 2005) divided children’s concepts into 
three different categories: ‘factual knowledge’ refers to concepts developed through first-hand experiences or secondary 
sources (television and books), ‘fictional knowledge or myths’ refers to secondary sources of knowledge (tales and stories), 
whereas ‘inferred knowledge’ is about those concepts that result from an interaction between children’s practical experiences 
and the existing concepts that they hold. The last category may lead to concepts that are not completely accurate and can 
have a profound influence on further conceptual development (Johnston, 2005). 
In all cases, scientific concepts are formed as a result of previous experiences and they can affect children’s learning of 
science (Eaton, Anderson, & Smith, 1984). The main avenue for young children’s scientific learning development is the 
information shared within their environment including, but not limited to, verbal interactions, skills demonstration, television, 
books, museum visits and, of course, play (Bradley, 1996; Hollins, Whitby, Lander, Parson, & Williams, 2001; De Kock, 2005; 
McGinn, 1998[AQ7]). For instance, when children use a see-saw, they experience that by pushing up one end of the see-saw, 
the other end will go down, even if they may not be able to verbalise their understanding in terms of physics. Even bath time 
can be a stimulus for children since while playing with bath toys, they can experience sinking and floating (when they push bath 
toys under the water some of them will sink and some others will come back up). 
As a result, preschoolers’ physical and social experiences explorations support the development of their scientific 
understanding (Johnston, 2005). Children use their everyday experience to develop their scientific concepts which they then 
divide into smaller ‘sub-concepts’ to help make them less abstract and more specific and restrictive (Bradley, 1996). The 
concepts and sub-concepts developed are then employed to identify patterns and relationships between the way things are 
made and the way they behave, whether it is the different forms that water can exist (liquid, gas or solid) or why and how a 
shadow appears. 
These firm cognitive concepts are very closely linked to children’s personal experiences, which can be wide ranging and 
diverse even if they are sometimes limited in understanding (Johnston, 2005). This can have a remarkable influence on the 
children’s subsequent cognitive development since the information capability of each child can set limits on the complexity of 
concepts that the child is able to cope with (Kambouri, 2015). Consequently, Guest (2003[AQ8]) highlights that conceptual 
development is not solely about becoming faster or fuller of knowledge, since the qualitative changes taking place when 
children are processing new information are equally (or even more) important than the speed of the process or the quantity of 
the new knowledge acquired. 
 
An overview of cognitive research 
Despite the wealth of research in the developmental psychology genre, there is currently a dearth of studies that have 
investigated the nature of preschoolers’ substantive science concepts – that is to say, those scientific ideas which are listed 
within programmes or syllabi such as the English National Curriculum (Department for Education, 2013). Substantive concepts 
tend to focus on science facts and understanding, and exclude process skills that fall within the category of scientific enquiry. 
Treagust (1988) adds that most researchers followed Piaget’s approach to probing children’s ideas, using interviews. 
For example, Osborne and Cosgrove (1983[AQ9]) investigated children’s ideas in relation to ice melting, water boiling, 
evaporating and condensing. These events were shown to children, during individual interviews, requiring the children to 
discuss and explain the phenomenon taking place (Osborne and Cosgrove, 1983). Similarly, Eaton et al. (1984) looked into 
children’s scientific concepts in relation to light, using observations and audio-recorded lessons (Eaton et al., 1984). The 
results indicate that children had difficulties in learning about light because neither their text nor their teachers dealt with their 
students’ prior knowledge and misconceptions adequately. 
A few years later, Gelman ( 1990) asked 4–5-year-olds what kinds of things were inside the bodies of animals (specifically 
people, elephants, cats, mice and birds). Common to all of the animals were blood, bones and heart, and individual animals 
were thought to have characteristic things inside them, with elephants containing water, mice, cheese and birds, feathers. In a 
study about how preschoolers consider kinship and family, children tended to attribute the same biological qualities to animals 
that they had been told were related to each other in a familial way, even though they looked different (Springer, 1992). 
Au (1994) e[AQ10]xplored some fundamental chemistry ideas of 3–5-year-olds, reporting that they were able to appreciate 
concepts of conservation of matter, including the understanding that a smaller piece taken from a larger chunk of material 
possesses the same properties as that larger chunk. Palmer (1995) used semi-structured interviews to  identify  young 
children’s (3–4-year-olds) ideas and understanding of waste management and Kalish (1996) looked at 3–5-year-olds’ ideas 
about the causes of illness, finding that children understood that germs can be the cause of disease but tended to under- 
generalise, attributing other causes to diseases that were actually germ-mediated and involved contagion or contamination. 
As a result, most research examples include ideas about how light or electricity travels, how water  changes []states, where in 
the body food is digested and what we can do to a material to make it permanently change into something else. This scarcity 
of relevant work means that preschool science conceptual research remains a rich vein for exploitation by education 
researchers. Findings from the psychological literature tend to focus on the measurement  of children’s reasoning faculties, 
with none of the clear links to teaching or pedagogy that is usually found in education articles. 
There has been more research on preschoolers’ substantive concepts in the science education genre, particularly recently, 
with these studies having more relevance to the science curricula taught in schools. For instance, Ravanis and Bagakis (1998) 
implemented a teaching intervention aiming to identify and change preschoolers’ mental representations of water’s 
gasification. The[AQ11] sample consisted of 49 preschool children who were randomly selected and the researchers used a 
pre-test and a post-test, one month before and one month after the intervention, to establish children’s ideas on an individual 
level. The tests asked for children to predict what would happen during an experiment demonstration on gasification as well as 
for their comments on a number of pictures shown to them representing the same phenomenon (Ravanis & Bagakis, 1998). 
The study’s results indicate that children were not able to predict the phenomenon (during the pre-test) while children’s 
answers were evidently []effected by their individual experiences. Some children gave sufficient answers in relations to ‘where 
the water goes’ during gasification, whereas some others made hypotheses and gave answers affected from the experimental 
apparatus (e.g. into the bottle, into the desk) (Ravanis & Bagakis, 1998). 
Valanides, Gritsi, Kampeza, and Ravanis (2000) interviewed 33 preschool children, using semi-structured interviews, aiming to 
identify and change their concepts of the day/night cycle. The children were randomly selected from an urban kindergarten of 
a mixed socio-economic status and none of them had previously received any formal or informal instruction concerning the 
respective topics. A teaching intervention was designed and implemented, aiming to teach preschoolers about the Sun and the 
Earth and the day/night cycle. The intervention was delivered by the researchers to small groups of children (6–7) and lasted 
for approximately 30 minutes. The effect was evaluated two weeks later using an interview similar to the one used prior to the 
intervention. Valanides et al. (2000) argue that most children more easily accepted that the Sun and the Earth are different 
spherical objects, but less easily that endorsed the idea that day and night relate to the Earth’s rotation on its axis. The 
children appeared to struggle with the idea of the Earth moving around the Sun and around its axis at the same time. The 
results indicate that children are not passive receivers of information and they bring their own views of the world to any 
teaching learning situation and these views, when not acknowledge, can interfere with their scientific learning (Valanides et al.,   
2000). 
A few years later, Gallegos-Cázares, Flores-Camacho, and Calderón-Canales (2009) were interested in preschoolers’ grasp of 
light concepts. They found that children understood that when mixing paints that different colours can be produced, but some 
incorrectly deduced that the end colour always depends on which of the starting colours were the ‘strongest’. Children also 
displayed misconceptions concerning shadows, including the ideas that shadows are objects themselves, are reflections of 
objects or have to be the same colour as the object. Similarly, Windt, Scheuer, and Melle (2014) looked at how science 
process skills could best be taught to a sample of 221 5–6-year-olds, giving differing degrees of autonomy to children while 
they conducted experiments. They found that although most children were capable of working autonomously, they learned 
more science only when they were less autonomous and given clear directions by nursery teachers. 
In a study that examined children’s ideas of natural phenomena, Saçkes, Flevares, and Trundle (2010) found that although 
many 4–6-year-olds understood that rain was water, and came from the clouds, some believed clouds bring water, but rain 
falls from the sky and/or that when rain hits the ground it disappears and ceases to exist. They recommend that a basic 
understanding of the water cycle would likely help children construct appropriate scientific ideas of natural phenomena such as 
rainfall. Research into preschool substantive science concepts has hardly ever considered how ideas change over time and 
how these changes relate to early years cognitive development theory. As discussed, there is a notable absence of this 
research from the four prestigious science education journals, which may be due to less enthusiastic editors who choose not to 
publish the material because of a perceived lack of reader-interest, or perhaps a shortage of submissions that reach the 
required quality. 
 
Misconceptions and conceptual change 
The conceptual change movement is generally considered to have started in earnest with the publication of one of the field’s 
seminal papers by Posner et al. of Cornell University in 1982. Posner et al. argued that changing a learner’s current way of 
thinking about a science theory is not necessary a straightforward matter, as they firstly need to be consciously dissatisfied 
about that theory as a valid representation. Any new, replacement theory will only be accepted if it is intelligible – is able to be 
understood; plausible – can solve present problems that the old theory cannot and fruitful – can solve any new problems. 
Their views were grounded in earlier work by Kuhn (1962, paradigm shifts) and Piaget (1977, cognitive disequilibrium). 
This realisation that conceptual change is complex yet potentially achievable within any science topic area by following certain 
steps led to the explosion of so-called misconception research that began in the early 1980s and is still prevalent today (Allen,   
2014). The term ‘misconception’ is used to refer to the children’s conceptions which differ from those generally accepted by 
the scientific community (Guest, 2003; Kambouri, 2015). In previous research and literature, this term can be also found as 
‘preconceptions’ (Ausubel, 1968[AQ12]; Kambouri, 2012[AQ13]), and ‘alternative frameworks’ (Driver, 1981 [AQ14]), whereas 
other authors have also used labels such us ‘alternative conceptions’, ‘intuitive theory’, ‘non-scientific ideas’ and ‘children’s 
ideas’ (Guest, 2003; Hamza & Wickman, 2007[AQ15]). What is mostly important though about children’s science 
misconceptions is that they can be an obstacle to children’s conceptual development when learning science. Stepans and 
Kuehn (1995) pointed out that misconceptions can make learning more difficult for children who will straggle to accept, learn 
and remember. 
It has been repeatedly stated that science misconceptions have their origins in experiences during early childhood but there is 
a surprising lack of research evidence that has demonstrated this. There is, however, a good number of conceptual change 
studies that have focused the scientific ideas on older children aged 5–11 years (Allen, 2014). If clear links could be made 
between this established body of work and what preschoolers are thinking, it would help ‘fill in the gaps’ and inform theory 
about how science ideas are first formed, with a view to designing interventions that encourage the construction of acceptable 
ideas at the preschool level. One of the current authors has suggested that such an approach could be called conceptual 
creation (Allen, 2015). 
 
The future of science learning 
A recent innovation takes the idea of linking children’s developing ideas further by formally recognising that changing science 
ideas can typically take predictable trajectories throughout a child’s schooling (preschooling included) (Allen, 2016). When a 
child is first taught a particular scientific idea, they do not necessarily leave the classroom with a complete, coherent or even a 
correct version of that idea (Harlen, 2010). It usually takes time for them to construct a final, finished concept that teachers can 
regard as scientifically acceptable. This may involve the idea changing several times as a succession of different ‘mental 
drafts’ are constructed over time. Each successive version becomes more sophisticated and closer to the scientific version. 
This string of changing concepts is a learning progression and shows how ideas naturally unfold over time (Plummer & 
Krajcik, 2010). 
As stated, learning progressions are a relatively recent innovation. They first emerged during the mid-2000s from mathematics 
education in America and were subsequently included as a key aspect of US curricula within the Next Generation Science 
Standards (NRC, 2012). The learning progression approach requires teachers to present science ideas as a tightly defined 
sequence during the teaching of a topic. These sequences are designed to encourage the retention of correct ideas and the 
rejection of incorrect features by presenting concepts in the precise order that they would naturally appear in children. Part of 
the rationale for this is to teach a curriculum that is informed by conceptual research, which is in contrast to curricula that have 
been devised by subject experts in a top-down way, not necessarily linked to the sequence in which children normally construct 
their changing ideas. 
Figure 1 is an example of a learning progression that is focused on the different topics of animals including humans as they 
are listed by the English National Curriculum (DFE, 2013). The P shows progression of concepts over the ages of 5–11 years 
that has used several conceptual research studies as a source. It can be seen that many of the concepts morph over this 
period into more sophisticated variants, while others remain unchanged. Kambouri (2015) highlights the importance of 
acknowledging children’s misconceptions when planning and teaching science, and to achieve learning progression, it is 
necessary to elicit children’s ideas prior to delivering the teaching sequence in order for each child’s  current  state  of 
attainment to be located on the LP[AQ16]. prior to delivering the teaching sequence children’s ideas. Work can thereafter be 
differentiated accordingly, with children being supported to reach the next level of the LP. It is important that the process be 
hierarchical, in that concepts at the lower reaches of the LP should be securely understood before higher concepts are 
introduced. One perhaps controversial aspect is that it is acceptable for the child to attain ‘halfway house’ concepts that do not 
completely reflect correct science. Referring to Figure 1, when learning about the concept of living, young children deciding 
whether or not something is alive can focus exclusively on whether or not it has eyes. If children are secure with this idea then 
it should be initially encouraged, but later built upon by introducing processes of life other than the ability to sense, as well as 
introducing examples of living things that do not possess eyes (notably plants). Although Figure 1 has columns for the typical 
ages of children, it must not be assumed that only children at a particular age are capable of understanding certain ideas. The 
word ‘typical’ is important here, and within the same class of children, individuals will not all be at the same level, some will lay 
at the upper end of the LP, while others at the lower end. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.   How learning progresses: animals including humans (adapted from Allen, 2016). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.   Continued. 
  
 
 
 
Research examples supporting learning progression 
It is currently difficult to produce learning progression for ages less than five years due to a lack of substantive science 
conceptual research, and as noted earlier, the studies into preschoolers’ science concepts that are available tend not to 
describe how ideas change over time. In the final section of this paper, we present exemplars of our own research that may go 
some way towards correcting this imbalance. The first study looked at 3–5-year-old’s ideas of animal classification, asking 
them to categorise plastic models of animals into the sets fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, mammals and insects (Allen, 2015). 
We also asked the children the reasons for their choices in order to determine set criteria. The fish data yielded interesting 
results. At three years, children tended to correctly place models of angelfish and clownfish into the fish category, basing their 
choices solely on physical attributes such as the model has fins and a tail and looks ‘fish-like’. In contrast, the five-year-olds 
incorrectly decided other models were fish such as the crab, jellyfish, starfish and octopus. This was  notable since it 
represented a decline in scientific knowledge with age; that is to say, the three-year-olds outperformed the five-year-olds, 
largely because the older children thought that any animal that lived in the sea and was capable of swimming was a fish. Other 
research with pupils aged 5–16 years has shown that between the ages of 5 and 11, this same belief was also prevalent but 
then start to improve after 11 years because the incorrect species were starting to be omitted from pupils’ fish sets, which 
constitutes U-shaped development of ideas over time (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.   U-shaped development of the fish concept over the ages 3–16 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second study examined the relationship between learning progression and teachers’ awareness of children’s 
misconceptions aiming to examine whether children’s ideas are more successfully altered when teachers are aware of the 
learners’ misconceptions (Kambouri, 2011[AQ17]). To investigate this, an experimental case study was designed and two 
kindergarten classes (4–5-year-old children) participated. A lesson on ‘Rain and the Water Cycle’ was observed, while being 
delivered by the classroom’s teacher, and three randomly selected children were interviewed before and after each lesson. 
The children were interviewed in groups, which encouraged their engagement and helped to identify their misconceptions in 
relation to the specific topic. The children’s answers from the first group were shared with the classroom children, something 
that did not happen for the case of the second group. The results showed a considerable difference between the learning 
progression when comparing the two groups, since the responses collected during the post-interviews with the children from 
the first group, who provided more correct answers and expressed fewer misconceptions, indicated a greater development and 
progress in their understanding of the specific phenomenon. Based on this case study, it is more likely for children to 
overcome their misconceptions when teachers take their initial misconceptions into account as they plan and teach science 
lessons (Kambouri, 2011). 
The last study looked at how 3–5-year-olds think about the kinds of food that animals eat (Allen, in preparation). We presented 
children with a series of simple three-step food chains, including grass → rabbit → fox and grass → zebra → lion. Children then 
chose which animal in each food chain was the predator, which was the prey, and whether any of the animals were herbivores 
and would eat the plant. The older children were more able to correctly identify predator, prey and herbivore, and also 
correctly recognise that the reason why the predator chased the prey was because it wanted to eat it – in contrast, the 
younger children tended not to know what happened next after the predator had caught the prey. Only as more studies are 
completed that characterise how preschoolers’ concepts change over time will we be able to construct learning progressions 
that can be of use to early years practitioners and inform their delivery of relevant, science material. 
 
Concluding comments 
The lack of studies of science conceptual development at the preschool level presents a golden opportunity for researchers to 
lay down firm foundations for how learning progressions originate in children’s early thinking. These findings would link 
together with the body of work that has shown how older children’s scientific ideas develop during the primary years, providing, 
ideally, a seamless continuum that both early years practitioners and primary teachers could utilise to plan and deliver lessons 
based on common theory. Evidentially sourced teaching is coming increasingly to the fore in England, which can only facilitate 
these processes, encouraging and inspiring researchers, and hopefully teachers themselves, to take teaching forward into the 
twenty-first century and help transform the profession into one which is strongly guided by and a generator of usable, valid 
research[AQ18]. 
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